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The Cologne Landgericht decision proclaiming religious circumcision to be a form of illegal assault will
apparently soon be superseded by legislation permitting the practice under certain conditions. Nevertheless, the
mere fact that the decision came about – coupled with its endorsement by many members of the German
criminal-law community and the fact that approximately half of Germans want to see religious circumcision
punished by law – points at a continuing controversy. Circumcision also presents an interesting cross-cultural
case study, since it is not expressly regulated in either the United States or (yet) in Germany. An enlightening
2002 analysis by Geoffrey P. Miller shows that all U.S. published U.S. court cases about male circumcision
involve botched operations or problems with obtaining parents’ consent. It appears that no U.S. court has yet
addressed a situation in which a doctor has been criminally prosecuted for competently performing a
circumcision with the consent of the child’s guardians.
Even were such a case to emerge, it’s difficult to imagine a similar outcome. Following the First Amendment’s
explicit ban on ‘established’ churches, the Supreme Court has limited government interference in private
religious rituals. A line of Supreme Court cases has called for the government to display a 'wholesome neutrality'
toward all religions, and to avoid unnecessary 'entanglement' of church and state. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has forbade American government entities from pronouncing on internal church administration, drawing
government administrative boundaries to accommodate religious sects, or banning controversial religious
practices under the pretext of public safety. This basic suspicion of intermingling secular administration and
religion is widespread among legal officials. The average District Attorney, presented with a case in which a third
party complained about a properly-performed circumcision, would almost certainly use her discretion not to
prosecute.
The second (somewhat related) strand of jurisprudence emphasizes family autonomy. In a landmark 1972 case,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court upheld the right of Old Order Amish families to withdraw their children from formal
education at the age of 16, observing that though there is no explicit guarantee of family autonomy in the
Constitution, 'the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in
their early and formative years have a high place in our society.' The state, for example, may not ban parents
from sending their children to private religious schools or even educating them at home, as long as curricular
standards are met. The fundamental Constitutional principle of American family law, repeated in case after case,
is to presume that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children ”. When the
parental autonomy is bound up with religious practice, the rationale for judicial circumspection becomes even
clearer.
And indeed, the decision of the Cologne court demonstrates the problems that occur when courts intrude in this
area. Considering its worldwide resonance, the decision itself is astoundingly brief, just a few paragraphs long.
At one point, the court accuses the doctor (and, by implication, the boy’s parents) of infringing the boy’s right to
choose his own religious affiliation. Yet the mere fact that a child is circumcised doesn’t irrevocably commit him
to Islam, as the 55% of American males who are circumcised can attest. Second, the court can hardly have
thought through its proposed right for children to freely choose their religion. Both of Germany’s established
religions provide for elaborate public rituals in which children are brought into their parents' or community’s faith
long before they are of age to make binding legal commitments under German law. Granted, these induction
ceremonies don’t involve circumcision, but the court did not bother to limit its principle only to these cases. Like
many legal commentators, the court also confidently proclaimed circumcision to be against the child’s best
interests without ever suggesting why the child’s parents, who obviously had different views, should be ignored.
These problems help explain the different reactions to the decision among German and foreign observers.
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Christian Germans (whether devout or nominal) are rarely circumcised. This is in stark contrast to the United
States, where routine circumcision was adopted during the late 19th century on hygiene grounds (including the
prevention of masturbation) which would now be considered dubious. Yet the practice remains well-accepted:
The American Pediatric Association recently concluded that "scientific evidence demonstrates potential medical
benefits of newborn male circumcision" and explicitly noted that it is "legitimate for parents to take into account
cultural, religious, and ethnic traditions, in addition to the medical factors, when making this decision." By
contrast, circumcision in Germany has only been customary among two religious minorities, one of which was
decimated during the Third Reich, and the other which only arrived in significant numbers in the last 40 years.
The generally positive reaction to the decision among Germany’s socially conservative legal culture shows a
lasting undercurrent of suspicion against customs and beliefs that have "non-European" roots – and of the
parents who wish to pass them on to their children.
Two Models of Freedom and Responsibility
Yet there is another factor driving the circumcision controversy: a stronger emphasis on social cohesion. Again,
the comparison with the United States is instructive. America is, in many respects, an an outlier in terms of
governmentally-enforced social cohesion. There is no national identity card in the United States, and some 10
per cent of the population has no picture identification of any kind. American rules regarding home schooling and
religious education are among the most liberal in the world. Unlike every other government in the world, the
American state is constitutionally debarred from banning hate speech and propaganda in the name of social
harmony. Aside from wartime, compulsory military or civil service has never existed in the United States. And, of
course, the American social safety net is designed only to provide transitional, time-limited aid. The possibility
that the devout might create self-perpetuating 'parallel societies', a perennial source of anguish in the European
media, is largely absent from American public discourse. This is not because such parallel societies do not exist
in the USA – quite the contrary is true – but because their existence is not seen as problematic as long as they
do not encourage crime or exploitation. (Of course, these libertarian hallmarks coexist with a massive security
sector and the highest imprisonment rates in the world – but exploring this paradox is beyond the scope of this
post.)
Although the German political order also guarantees its citizens wide-ranging civil freedoms, the approach is
subtly different. In an interesting article on the 'German Idea of Freedom' Edward J. Eberle argues that
Germany’s conception of individual liberty — while robust and deeply-rooted — differs significantly from that
found in the United States. In contrast to the freewheeling American conception of individual rights (accompanied
by an equally unfettered free market), the German conception of liberty 'take[s] place within a moral structure
erected on ethical concepts that include human dignity and its multiple radiations, people acting within the
bounds of a social community with its ensuing reciprocal obligations, and a Sozialstaat.' Further, the discussion
of rights in Germany is coupled with 'duties rooted deeply in the culture and community'.
This conception of 'freedom' conditioned by social integration (which, of course, prevails in many Continental
European cultures) enables the state to make claims on its citizens that would be controversial in Anglo-Saxon
countries. German court decisions, for example, permit government officials to reject parents' chosen names for
their children on a number of grounds, including that the name might subject the child to ridicule or does not
clearly indicate the child’s gender. Until recently, military service was compulsory in Germany, although many
young men opted out under liberal conscientious-objector laws. Germany also has a registration law, which
requires Germans to timely inform their government of any change in address. Germany has comprehensive
federal laws regulating everything from the permissible size of huts on garden allotments to the content of
vacation contracts, and a sizable contingent of ‘order police’ (the Ordnungsamt) to enforce them. The German
legal order does not provide for untrammeled free speech – pro-Nazi rhetoric is illegal, and media which publish
insulting or privacy-intruding material may be confiscated and their owners fined.
The flip side of this intrusion is an impressive network of social rights and benefits. Despite recent reforms,
German social welfare benefits are still much more generous than their American counterparts — but recipients
may also required to submit to intrusive surveillance. Germany has universal health insurance provided by
subsidized insurance companies which are run on the principle of ‘solidarity’. Germans receive large welfare
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subsidies for having children, and enjoy some of the most generous family leave policies in the world. Virtually all
higher education is provided free of charge (or for nominal tuition) by government-funded universities. All
workers are guaranteed several weeks of paid vacation per year. Even welfare recipients can petition for extra
money to pay for a child’s wedding or a vacation.
To put it simply, the German social bargain permits the state to intrude more deeply into citizens' affairs in certain
areas, in return for providing them with an array of services designed to foster personal development and
socialize common life-risks. Germans face more subtle pressure to conform to majority social norms, but in
return enjoy benefits conferred by that majority itself. This ideology of ‘duties rooted deeply in the culture and
community’ may have influenced the German court’s reasoning: Instead of simply endorsing parental autonomy
tout court, the judges asked whether the parents’ choice would bind their child closer to the majority ‘culture and
community’ of Germany. Because it would not, it was that much easier to second-guess. Yet the reaction to the
court’s decision seems to mark a subtle shift in consensus-minded Germany toward accommodating beliefs and
rituals which will always remain outside the mainstream.
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